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1. INTRODUCTION
“Argumentative patterns in discourse” (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2013) discusses
the role of “communicative activity types” as these form institutional practices that
strive to accommodate an “argumentative predicament”. Namely, advocates have to
construct and keep up “the balance between aiming for effectiveness and
maintaining reasonableness in every argumentative move.” This requires “continual
‘strategic manoeuvering’ on the part of the arguers.” The paper finds in the
particular case examined little but “stereotypical argumentative patterns in plenary
debate in the European parliament.”
This reply thinks cooperatively along with pragma-dialectics, but in a
particular way. I read across the literature on argumentation theory and its
practices. In short, I am enthusiastic about what may become a critical turn
generating pragama-dialectical intervention into pragmatic questions of
institutional competence and growth. On the other hand, I think such a turn could
benefit from the development of relationships between the pragma-dialectical
project and current understanding of institutional theories. Such expansion would
supplement an already rich theoretical and empirical agenda.
2. THE DILEMMA AND THE PREDICAMENT
First, I would like to discuss the predicament as a generative idea for mapping
argumentation encounters. Such mapping can put us on the track to discovering
more about ingenium or the special epistemic capacity to resolve situations that
seemingly reach an impasse, only to find unexpected, contingent structures to
extend practice productively. To accomplish this, consider the difference between
regarding incompatible claims of a dilemma or a predicament. I turn to the PortRoyal school (1850, p. 229) to furnish a classic example of a dilemma:
We can only be happy in this world by abandoning ourselves to our passions, or by
combating them; If we abandon ourselves to them, this is an unhappy state, since it
is disgraceful, and we could never be content with it; If we combat them, this is also
an unhappy state, since there is nothing more painful than that inward war which
we are continually obliged to carry on with ourselves; We cannot, therefore, have in
this life true happiness.
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-4.
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The dilemma strategically maneuvers us to the limits of rational engagement.
There is no way to be consistent and to pursue desirable ends. The human condition
permits only dignity without pleasure or pleasure without dignity; either way one is
left distraught and dissatisfied. Fools and hypocrites try to have it both ways,
rational actors see the world clearly. The problem with the dilemma is that it is a
self-constructed trap. Either-or thinking is secured by the law of contradiction. A
thing cannot be both a and non a at the same time. The thinking reinforces dualism,
such as mind or body, permanence or change, order or disorder. Dialectic depends
upon abstractions which convert common sense or doxa into episteme through
considered rationalizing of categories.
The predicament is like a dilemma, but different. Two opposing propositions
are put into reciprocal relation. Instead of becoming ensnared in the skeptical trap,
the predicament situates thought in action. The predicament poses two competing
ends and invites action that resists either and invents both and ways of swerving
around the polarities of a dilemma. Humans find ways to have their cake and eat it
to, the maxim goes. The realistic practice of argumentation finds efforts to reach
both a well-grounded, coherent and informed position evident on its face while at
the same time taking into account the stresses of overcoming indifference, prejudice
or resistance. I agree with Houtlosser and van Eemeren in finding the predicament
as key to argument as a realistic practice (2003).
Forms take shape in material conditions in a variety of way. There are
multiple versions of the basic dilemma, each in themselves offering interesting
windows into the nature and risks of argumentation in practice. Critical intervention
can map the turning points at which ingenious resolutions occurred with special
institutional, aesthetic, moral, ethical or scientific predicaments embedded in the
argumentation were changed from the impasse of dilemma to the productive site of
ingenious reinvention of the organizing terms for argument. Ingenium has always
been discounted as having neither the authority of expertise nor the support of the
masses. Recent discussion innovation, diffusion, entrepreneurship on the one hand
the social imaginary, the noosphere, and crowd sourcing on the other provide a rich
context where the basic insights of pragma-dialectic could be extended, emphasizing
creative intervention.
2. NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The papers invite exploring the overlap between new institutional theory and
argumentation. New institutional theory (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991) rests in the realization that human being are not strictly rational in
their moves from calculating profit to sustaining relationships. If this were the case,
no contract would rest but interests would be renegotiated constantly. Herbert
Simon (1991) believes that institutional actors value contracts because they
discover it is more reliable to invest trust with those with whom you have
successfully dealt. This view was based on what Simon called “bounded rationality.”
Human beings can absorb a finite amount of information. Choices have to be made
on what information to take in, process, and evaluate and when to let a decision rest.
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So, too, decision makers will stand by a contract, foregoing marginal changes in risk
calculation, in order to preserve a reputation and a relationship with a partner.
Van Eemeren and Garssen may be exploring the way institutional logics
within a communicative practice become subject to bounded communicative
rationality. That is, in each case, state of the art practices must strike a balance
between what is rationally demonstrable to be the best possible enactment of an
activity type and what succeeds because it has met and continues to meet the
expectations of agents engaged in the institution. State-of-the art practices vary by
institution, and among organizations within an institution. A few activity types may
constitute core argument roles for the exercise of practice; other activities may be
viewed as in a supportive or peripheral role. Activity types can be stable for a long
time, but suddenly be subject to change. In medicine, the doctor pretty much
occupied the role of benevolent provider, until changes in the health profession
redefined for some the exchange as deliberation and partnership. New institutional
theory can connect argument to how presumptions reflect risk preferences, which
in turn are influenced by standards of proof and definitions of evidence. To the
extent that institutions are historical developments, studies of the activity types
over time as these are stabilized, refreshed, abandoned, recovered, combined and
separated may be useful to under the relationship between argument and
institutional change.
3. HYBRIDITY
Van Eemeren and Garrsen recognize that activity types put into practice are hybrids.
I think this is a good insight. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006) attempt to
recover rhetoric by sorting out worlds of value. The authors find justification fall
into six worlds: the civic, market, industrial, domestic, inspiration and fame.
Argument is put into practice when two of the worlds are put into a contingent (not
necessary) but powerful relationship. The world of fame and markets explains the
justifications for investing in Hollywood. The worlds of industry and inspiration
make up my university in California. The civic and market world define democratic
politics by special interests. Arguments innovate when activity types merge in novel
ways to advance the prominence if not necessary the quality of state of the art
practices. The initial situation, starting points, means and criticism, and outcome are
typified in a dynamic expectation of movement and fulfillment of form—or
avoidance of hazard. Pragma-dialectics could evaluate Boltanski and Thévenot’s
version of hybrid structures formed out of compromise between different orders of
justification.
4. CRITICAL INQUIRY OF DEBATE
The turn to critical study of debate is important. Of the areas of inquiry into
argumentation, I think this one of the most important and relatively under
addressed. Institutional, international debate is a feature of global life that pits
interests that transcend state sovereignty at issue, with support depending actually
upon states to continue within and support novel institutions of government. The
3
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question of debate particularly in Europe is how at the same time to honor common
interests while accommodating differences in national identity. I study debates as
well, mostly bad debates, but each filled with arguments that match general claims
to deliberative justification with political strategic maneuvering. I believe that a
debate can be stereotypical, boring, but fascinating (from a specialist point of view)
precisely because understatement builds up security.
It is easier to address matter-of-fact rather than matter of identity issues in
international forums. Yet, the needs of government for legitimacy and traditional
rivalries are never completely below the surface. Are such debates characterized by
a lower level of manoeuevering than one would expect generally? The answer can
be found in nationalist reprise on EU policy. Are these debates the result of draining
the juice from the arguments so contention is drained from support? The
transportation argument is dull, but transportation planning has the consequence of
creating an identifiable good that can be agreed to, thereby strengthening the
institution. Of, finally do the debates act as a code, expressing controversies but in
ways that preserves the fiction of an international community while giving voice to
continuing nation interests? The question of what is “real” juice or safe farm animals
seems a code of resituating national interest in the language of commodity, which
itself is a thin covering for regional identity and preference. In the end, even
stereotypical debates can have interesting aspects. There are many ways of reading
EU arguments, but it would require comparative analysis of predicaments for
different audiences, appraising the difference between national and international
contexts, and discovery of the strengths and weakness of hybrid melding of national
and international interests. Critical argument inquiry is certainly a space that invites
pragma-dialectical studies, but there is work yet to do.
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